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Book Note
THE REGULATORY AFTERMATH OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
CRISIS, by Eilís Ferran, Niamh Moloney, Jennifer G. Hill, and 
John C. Coffee, Jr. 1
REUBEN ZARAMIAN
THE TURMOIL THAT ERUPTED after global markets crashed in 20082 opened the way 
for a rush of regulatory reforms at nearly every level of government and industry. 
In Th e Regulatory Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, Ferran et al detail these 
worldwide developments, focusing particularly on changes in the European Union, 
Australia, and the United States.
Ethiopis Tafara opens the monograph3 with a broad and insightful analysis of 
what exactly went wrong on a macro level, and off ers a task list of changes needed 
to stabilize the regulatory framework. At its simplest, the 2008 crisis was caused 
by markets and fi nancial services evolving where systems and facilities did not. 
Capital markets today are not quite what they were a few decades ago. Th e market 
is now “global in nature”; “characterized by fi erce competition” between fi nancial 
service providers; “no longer features barriers between … products, sectors and 
actors”; features increasing costs of “monitoring conduct and risk”; and “features 
large and relatively liquid unregulated institutional fi nancial markets.”4 In line with 
what has been said by a host of economists and regulators,5 Tafara suggests that 
1. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 391 pages.
2. Sometimes referred to as the ‘Great Recession.’ See David Wessel, “Did ‘Great Recession’ 
Live Up to the Name?”, Th e Wall Street Journal (8 April 2010) online: <http://on.wsj.
com/1ihDKux >. Also referred to as the ‘Lesser Depression.’ See Paul Krugman, “Th e Lesser 
Depression”, Th e New York Times (21 July 2011) online: <http://nyti.ms/19rImGy >.
3. Ibid at xi.
4. Ibid at xi-xxiii.
5. A vast amount of research and commentary has been published on this topic. See especially, 
Viral V Acharya & Matthew Richardson, Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed 
System (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2009); Paul Krugman, Th e Return of Depression 
Economics and the Crisis of 2008 (New York: WW Norton, 2009); David Wessel, In Fed We 
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these deviations “require an equivalent shift in regulatory approach.”6
Th e fi rst chapter7 starts out with the premise that imperfections in regulatory 
reform are inevitable; it is vital to evaluate the processes used during and after 
transformation eff orts.8 Eilís Ferran presents a comprehensive overview of EU 
post-crisis fi nancial services law reform, but readily admits her focus is “selective.”9 
Ferran’s interest lies in the factors contributing to the “post-crisis regulatory 
agenda.”10 She considers the “preferences of the key opinion-formers,” and 
determines which of those have materialized into law and which have been 
“fi ltered out.”11 Ferran suggests that the “logical end point is a pan-European system 
of regulation and supervision with national supervisors reduced mostly to a branch 
offi  ce role”—with a greater role being played by the European Commission.12
In the second chapter,13 Niamh Moloney considers post-crisis reforms in 
the EU “from a regulatory design perspective,” and examines the legacy of those 
reforms.14 Moloney suggests that the “key regulatory innovation” has been 
addressing fi nancial market intensity and fi nancial market innovation.15 She 
describes this eff ect as signifi cantly expanding the breadth of market regulation. 
With respect to consumer protection regulation, the eff ect has been the introduction 
of new “retail market regulatory tools related to product intervention,”16 such as 
restricting markets for fi nancial instruments that might raise investor protection 
concerns.17 Moloney concludes with the evaluation that these “innovations are 
neither wholly good nor wholly bad.”18
Trust: Ben Bernanke’s War on the Great Panic (New York: Crown Business, 2009). 
6. Supra note 1 at xii.
7. Eilís Ferran, “Crisis-driven regulatory reform: where in the world is the EU going?” in Ferran 
et al, supra note 1 at 1.
8. Ibid at 5-6.
9. Ibid at 8.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid at 108-09.
13. Niamh Moloney, “Th e legacy eff ects of the fi nancial crisis on regulatory design in the EU?” 
in Ferran et al, supra note 1 at 111.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid at 112.
16. Ibid at 202.
17. Ibid at 190.
18. Ibid at 202.
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In chapter three,19 Jennifer Hill sets out to correct the self-laudatory position 
of Australian government offi  cials in their assessment of how well Australia fared 
during the crisis. Part I explores Australia’s experience of, and response to, the crisis, 
while Part II provides an overview of the country’s market regulation. Part III looks 
at the role of regulation through the crisis period. Part IV looks at supranational 
agreements, and Part V considers recent regulatory reforms. By the end of Part 
VI, Hill demonstrates that Australia’s performance was due to its strong pre-crisis 
position, as well as a range of contributing economic, legal, and regulatory factors.
In the fi nal chapter,20 John Coff ee, Jr. attempts to highlight the oppositional 
perspectives of those involved in the debate on regulatory reform. His project 
is to demonstrate that the 2008 crisis is “being wasted”21—that history repeats 
itself when it is ignored.22 Coff ee takes issue with what he calls the “‘Tea Party 
Caucus’ of corporate and securities law professors,”23 arguing that their position 
is fundamentally unsound. In Part II, he shows how fi nancial reform legislation 
is and can be “frustrated” by opponents.24 Part III demonstrates how the 2002 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act25 has been diminished “at the implementation stage.”26 Part 
IV examines the policy considerations that inspired the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act,27 
and Part V considers the implementation of that Act. 
Having read through the wealth of material presented by these leading scholars, 
readers would be well served to revisit Tafara’s prescient foreword, which insists 
on a program of regulatory change “types” needed—and detailed in subsequent 
chapters—to make world markets stronger than before. Th is collection of essays 
is cohesive in its argument and masterful in its presentation of details. Light 
reading it is not.
19. Jennifer G Hill, “Why did Australia fare so well in the global fi nancial crisis?” in Ferran et al 
supra note 1 at 203.
20. John C Coff ee, Jr, “Th e political economy of Dodd-Frank: Why fi nancial reform tends to be 
frustrated and systemic risk perpetuated” in Ferran et al, supra note 1 at 301.
21. Supra note 1 at 312.
22. Ibid at 368.
23. Th e Caucus consists of Roberta Romano, Yale Law School; Stephen Bainbridge, UCLA 
Law School; and Larry Ribstein, University of Illinois College of Law. In Coff ee’s view, 
the Caucus members together believe that: (1) “Congress should not legislate after market 
crashes”; (2) “state laws are superior to federal law in regulating corporate governance”; 
and (3) “federal securities law should … not attempt substantive regulation of corporate 
governance.” Ibid at 306-07.
24. Ibid at 311.
25. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, PL 107-204, 116 Stat 745.
26. Supra note 2 at 311.
27. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L No 111- 203, 124 Stat 
1376 (2010).
